Senior Defense Official Briefs on 2024 China Military Power Report

View Online Senior Defense Official Briefs on 2024 China Military Power Report Dec. 18, 2024 Conducted on December 16, 2024 SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you all for joining. On Wednesday, December 18th, the department will release this year's China military power report. I thought I would open with some framing remarks and some key themes from this year's report and then open it up for questions. As you're aware, our national security strategy identifies the PRC as the only competitor with the intent and increasingly, the capability to reshape the international order. The 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies the PRC and its increasingly capable military as the department's top pacing challenge. In the past, we've said that each year's China military power report illustrates why the NSS and the NDS identify the PRC as a competitor in the security realm and as the DOD's pacing challenge. And this year's CMPR is no different. As in past years, this congressionally mandated report charts the current course of the PRC's national economic and military strategies and offers insights into the People's Liberation Army or PLA's strategy, its current capabilities and activities, as well as its future modernization goals. As our baseline assessment of PRC military and security developments during 2023, along with some content on significant developments and events in 2024, this year's CMPR covers a lot of ground. I'm looking forward to answering your questions, but first, I'd like to offer some key takeaways and themes and raise a number of new topics that are covered in this year's report. So first of all, here are some key takeaways from this year's report. First, the PRC is forging ahead with its long-standing national strategy while confronting what it views as an increasingly turbulent strategic environment. The PRC seeks to amass national power to achieve what Xi Jinping has referred to as the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049 and to revise the international order in support of the PRC's system of governments and its national interests. In 2023, and into this year as well, the PRC acknowledged that internal and external challenges have complicated its economic recovery and growth, which may have impacts on the PLA. PLA modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of the PRC's broader aspirations for its national development, which involve heavily investing in technological self-sufficiency and an advanced manufacturing. Second key takeaway, the PLA continues to make steady progress in modernizing its conventional capabilities, but it also continues to struggle with long-standing deficiencies. In 2023, the PLA demonstrated key capabilities such as long range joint fires in major exercises such as the April 2023 Joint Sword exercise. Some PLA services also reached key modernization milestones of their own. The PLA Air Force, for example, with respect to its modernization and indigenization of its unmanned aerial systems, is quickly approaching US standards. At the same time, through 2023 and again into 2024, PLA media have continued to highlight long standing problems in the PLA, and they especially highlight what they perceive as shortcomings with their commanders and personnel quality. The PLA continues to highlight what they refer to as the five incapables, which is a PLA slogan asserting that some PLA commanders are incapable of judging situations, understanding higher authorities' intentions, making operational decisions, deploying forces or managing unexpected situations. And despite the PLA's rapid development, it has not yet demonstrated the type and sophistication of certain capabilities it would need in a major regional contingency. These include urban warfare and long distance logistics. Third key takeaway, the PLA continues to struggle with deeply rooted problems of corruption. This year's CMPR includes corruption of the PLA as a special topic, acknowledging the severe corruption challenges the PLA has faced in the preceding year. In the second half of 2023 alone, at least 15 high-ranking military officials and defense industry executives were removed from their posts for corruption. Several were responsible for overseeing equipment development projects related to modernizing China's ground-based nuclear and conventional missiles. The most prominent of these cases was of course former Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu in late October 2023, but others included the former PLA Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao and political commissar Xu Zhongbo, as well as several deputy commanders. And earlier this year, the PLA dissolved its Strategic Support Force after creating it in December 2015 to consolidate its space cyber electronic information and psychological warfare capabilities. This decision to dissolve the Strategic Support Force reveals compelling concerns that were sufficient to merit the dissolution of the force. This wave of corruption related investigations and the removal of senior leaders may have disrupted the PLA's progress toward its 2027 goals. Fourth key takeaway is that the PLA continues its rapid nuclear build up DOD estimates the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads as of mid-2024 and we estimate the PRC will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030. The department also assesses the PRC will continue growing its nuclear force through at least 2035. Fifth key takeaway, the PRC continues to intensify its pressure against allies and partners such as the Philippines and Taiwan. Throughout 2023, the PRC escalated tensions with the Philippines in the South China Sea by ramming and boarding vessels en route to supply Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC also amplified its diplomatic political and military pressure against Taiwan in 2023 and into this year. And finally, the last key takeaway, PRC Russia ties remain strong. The PRC continues to support Russia with material assistance as well as by promoting Russian narratives, blaming the United States and NATO for its war with Ukraine. Excuse me. PRC and Russian bilateral military exercises through 2023 maintained exercises at levels that we have seen in previous years and it's signaling the enduring strength of the PRC Russia partnership. I'd also like to address a couple of other themes here as well before we turn to the Q and A. On PLA strategy, the Chinese Communist Party maintained its long-standing objective of achieving, as I mentioned earlier, what Xi Jinping refers to as the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049. Despite economic headwinds and a slow recovery throughout 2023, PRC leaders assessed their power to shape world events was growing and that they have what they refer to as new strategic opportunities to create an environment that's favorable to achieving their interests and goals. The PRC's stated defense policy remains oriented toward safeguarding its sovereignty, security and development interests, while emphasizing more of a greater global role for itself. This policy largely understates the PRC's objective of revising the international order in support of its interests, as well as its system of governance. One key part of the PRC defense policy is its counter intervention approach, which aims to be prepared to counter the US in the East and South China Sea, as well as in the broader Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, the PRC is strengthening its capabilities to reach farther into the Pacific Ocean and beyond. With respect to Xi Jinping's most near-term capability milestone for the PLA, she continued to reaffirm his commitment to the PLA's 2027 milestone for modernization, which if realized could give the PLA the capacity to be a more credible military tool for the Chinese Communist Party's Taiwan unification efforts. On PLA capabilities, the PRC has continued the development of capabilities and concepts to strengthen its ability to, as they would put it, to fight and win wars against a strong enemy. PLA services are making steady and incremental progress toward their respective modernization goals. The PLA Army, for example, has demonstrated long range fires capabilities. The PLA Navy has conducted new operations beyond the first island chain. The PLA Air Force absorbed significant portions of PLA Naval Aviation. And the PLA Rocket Force continued to develop new missiles, including ICBMs, potentially including conventionally armed systems. Before dissolving the Strategic Support Force in April 2024, the SSF's components continued to rapidly mature the PRC's space enterprise, and of course that work has continued after the dissolution of the Strategic Support Force. The PRC has continued developing counterspace capabilities that can contest or deny other nations access to and operations in the space domain. These include direct ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites, electronic warfare and directed energy systems. The PLA Joint Logistics Support Force, or JLSF, has also continued improving joint strategic and campaign level logistics and trying to become more efficient by integrating civilian products and services. And this often focuses on facilitating the movement of PLA forces for equipment and training. The JLSF will probably play a similar traffic routing role in a mobilization or wartime scenario. And lastly, before turning to the Q and A, I'd like to highlight just a little bit of the new content that appears in the report. Some other notable updates to this year's report include some discussion on what the PRC sees as its core interests and on what it means when it describes its objective as achieving national rejuvenation. We've also included discussion of the PLA's growing nuclear and strategic capabilities, including space, counterspace and cyber capabilities. There is additionally some discussion on the PLA's relationship with Iranian proxies and its stance on Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, on the PRC's approach to the Israel-Hamas war and also a new section on PRC defense spending that evaluates the PRC's published defense budget. We have in addition, a new section on PRC influence operations, which they refer to as cognitive domain operations. Some new content on how a military conflict in the Western Pacific would challenge the PRC's ability to secure its energy supplies, which I think is a notable new area of content for us, as well as some updates on the PLA's inventory of various types of capabilities, including the hypersonic glide vehicle capable DF-17. We've got a robust discussion on the status and the trajectory of bilateral defense contacts and exchanges, as well as a summary of PLA exercises, professional military education and training with foreign militaries. And the report also looks at some of the PRC's lessons learned from Russia's war in Ukraine. There are also three new special topics in this year's report, the impacts of corruption on the PLA, which I mentioned earlier, one on political training in the PLA, and finally, a new special topic on the PRC's views of what it refers to as comprehensive national power. So with that, I'm happy to open up for questions and my public affairs colleagues here are going to help moderate. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  All right. Thank you very much. We'll have Lita Baldor with AP give us our first question. Thank you. Q:  Hi. Good afternoon. Thanks a lot for doing this. I was wondering if you could just expand a little bit on—you talked about how they're reaffirming their commitment to 2027, but the report also talks about the impact of corruption, particularly on the 2027 goals. Does the US believe that 2027 is no longer as achievable for the PRC, particularly as it relates to reunification with Taiwan? And then just a quick, the recent naval activity around Taiwan. That's, I'm guessing, not addressed in the report. I'm wondering if that changes anything? Thank you. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Thank you very much for the question. On 2027, I would reiterate that we don't think that uh conflict is imminent or inevitable. We think that we have deterrence today that's real and strong. We're doing a lot to try to keep it that way. Xi Jinping has reaffirmed his commitment to the 2027 milestone for modernization, which they define as being about integrating the development of mechanization informatization and intelligentization , excuse me, of the PRC's armed forces. And we do judge that that is a capability development milestone that could give the PLA greater capacity to be a more credible military tool for the Chinese Communist Party's unification efforts.  We note in the report that the substantial problems they have with corruption that have yet to be resolved certainly could slow them down on the path toward the 2027 capabilities development milestone and beyond and I think that's our judgment in terms of the potential impact of corruption on the PLA's ability to achieve those milestones. The other question, I think, although we try to keep the report up to date, it is not quite that up to date as to address the most recent PLA operations that you mentioned. And so I don't have anything else to share on that at this point. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thank you. Next, we'll go to Jeff Schogol with Task and Purpose. Q:  Thank you very much. The report has the exact same number of ships in the PLA Navy as last year, more than 370 vessels. I'm hoping that you can say or provide a little more clarity exactly how many vessels does the PLA have? And I also, I'm a little confused about force structure. Last year's report said PLA ground forces were four million. This year it says it's three million. There are half as many reservists and no paramilitary forces included. Can you explain the discrepancy? Thank you. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  I think I'll have to get back to you on the second question to make sure that we give you an answer that's as accurate and complete as possible, on the specific numbers of personnel in the ground forces. And on the size of the PLA Navy and shipbuilding, I think, unfortunately, all I can do here is refer you to the report. I don't have anything to share beyond what's covered in the report with respect to the details of shipbuilding and deliveries to the PLA Navy. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thanks. Next question will go to John Ismay with The Times. Q:  Hi, there. This may have been in the report, and I could have missed it, but I was wondering if you could explain who exerts command and control of Chinese forces outside of the country. I saw that the geographic Theater command, north, south, east, west central, but I didn't see anything about who's in charge of, say, camps in Djibouti or elsewhere. And as sort of a corollary to that, I noticed the discussion of a carrier going to the Philippine Sea three times. Does the US have any sort of assessment on when a Chinese carrier strike group might, say, be able to reach Oahu or San Diego? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  OK. Well, I would note on the first question that the PLA's current theater command structure dates back to its last major round of reforms and reorganization, which were announced at the end of 2015. And their overseas command structure as of yet is not as well developed as their theater commands. So their overseas operations are commanded under the authority of a specific task force as in the case of the Gulf of Aden or otherwise under service authorities, which usually would be the PLA Navy, at least for now because they tend to be the ones who are globally deployed. So the PLA has demonstrated some limited joint operational capabilities beyond the first island chain, but by and large when we're talking about overseas activities, we're mostly talking about activities that are conducted by single services and that don't involve combat operations. So that's kind of where they are right now, with respect to that question. On the aircraft carrier, the report doesn't speculate on when the PLA Navy might be able to conduct carrier operations in the locations that you described, out to Hawaii or to the west coast. It does discuss at some length, the PLA Navy's efforts to increase its power projection capabilities. And I'd refer you to the report for the details, but I would say that these have included efforts to increase the PLA Navy's distance sea training and what they call distance sea training. That includes in the eastern Indian Ocean and in the western Pacific Ocean. And they also have a pretty significant level of global engagements, including port calls as distant as the Middle East and Africa. So I think that's a pretty good encapsulation of where they are right now. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thanks. Next will be Natalia from Bloomberg. Q:  Thanks so much for the question. I just wanted to follow up on the point about corruption slowing down the modernization. Can you elaborate on why that is? Is it because the corruption, the anti-corruption programs is sapping resources, or is it the fact that they're having to find replacement for these commanders? Any more detail would be really helpful. Thanks so much. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Sure. I can offer a little bit there. I think I would say it's, partially what you identified in your question, that frequent turnover and replacement of high-level personnel certainly can be disruptive. And then the other point that I would add is that as they look to uncover corruption in, for instance, in a particular sector in the defense industry or in a major military construction project, I think that can have the effect of slowing them down as they try to conduct thorough investigations and try to understand the depth and the extent of corruption in a particular case. And then as you may be tracking from reading some of the public reporting that the PRC puts out often on the investigations and the outcome of the investigations, it frequently seems to be the case that once they uncover corruption in one place or involving one senior official, there's sort of a bit of a spiraling kind of effect where it inevitably seems to draw in additional officials who are connected to that one official who is originally at the center of the investigation, or from one project, it seems that they will then start to look into other related projects that are related because either of the nature of the work or because of the entity that was responsible for the project projects or both and find additional instances of corruption, which then require further investigation and may generate additional leads. So it seems to be that that kind of process here is also contributing to that assessment that this is something that may have the impact of slowing them down on the path that they're trying to be on to realize those capabilities development milestones. Q:  Sorry, just a quick follow up. Is it conceivable that they could abandon the anti-corruption goals just to meet the modernization ones? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  I don't think so. I mean that's ultimately, of course, a question that you could ask the PRC. But Xi Jinping appears to have made the anti-corruption campaign not only in the PLA, but in the party more broadly, really a hallmark of his tenure as the top leader. And I think that while corruption may slow them down, I think they've identified it as something that really poses great risks to the political reliability and ultimately the operational capability of the PLA. So I would certainly expect them to continue to pursue the anti-corruption campaign. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thank you. Next will be Noah Robertson, please. Q:  Hey. Thank you for doing this. I have a couple questions here. To start out with, I wanted to know if your assessment is that the current Minister of National Defense Dongjun is under investigation right now for corruption as well. And then secondarily, whether this overall is a solvable problem given the lack of a watchdog or independent media in the country? And then I have a follow up. Thank you. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Sure. I think Sabrina Singh addressed some of the media reports that you referred to pretty recently. We don't have anything new to add there. We're not in the position to confirm or deny any particular reports about any specific investigation into a specific individual. So I would just refer you to the PRC on that. And on the second part of the question, there were other anti-corruption campaigns that preceded Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign. If you remember all the way back to the late 1990s, for example, under Jiang Zemin's leadership, they ordered the PLA out of business and that was its own process. There were anti-corruption campaigns under Hu Jintao during his tenure as top leader, although they did not reach as high levels of the PLA and take down people of the kind of level and stature within their system that we've seen under Xi Jinping. So certainly, this seems to be a long-standing problem that has gone across the tenures of multiple top leaders in the PRC and it's something that, as I mentioned, Xi Jinping has really emphasized since his ascension to that position and the problem persists. So I think it's a good assessment that you've made that there are deeper structural problems that have inhibited them in terms of really being able to root it out. Q:  On the follow up there, the 2035 goals that were moved to 2027 several years back in line with Xi's intent to have the capability though not the intent to unify with Taiwan by that year. I'm wondering if this is a sign given the corruption that it was, I don't want to say premature, but not feasible to move those goals so far left. Is that part of the assessment here? Am I misunderstanding that? I went more string on what Lita was asking. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Sure. Well, I'd say the PRC still has three different capabilities, development milestones for the PLA. So it's not the case that they changed 2035 to make it earlier. They added 2027 as an additional kind of interim milestone in between a when that was added in 2035. So they do still have 2027, 2035 and 2049 capabilities development milestones for the PLA. 2027, we've already talked about. 2035 is when the PLA is, as they put it, it's supposed to basically complete its modernization. And then 2049 is the not as well-defined, but it's to become a world-class military. So they've got these three capability development milestones. And right now all three remain in effect as kind of targets for the PLA as it proceeds with its modernization toward 2049. Also, of course, is the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the PRC and the target for national rejuvenation. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thank you. Next, we'll hear from Sam LaGrone. Q:  Hi. So looking at your report, you kind of talked a little bit about some recruiting and retention challenges that the PLA has had kind of hinted at throughout there. Two questions. One, can you all give us a sense of how that effort is going for the PLA in order to meet their goals? And then second, are you seeing any signs of the efficacy of their actual troops? I mean, it's real easy to look at a shipyard from space, going like, hey, they're building ten ships. I guess, it's harder for us to say, hey, are these folks actually any good. If you could kind of just touch on those two, that would be great. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  So we do cover some of the personnel issues in the report. I don't really have more to share beyond what's in the report. I guess I would just highlight that the PLA for a long time has thought it very important to pay attention to the quality of personnel. This is, again, something that predates the Xi Jinping era. If you go all the way back to Jiang Zemin, even then they talked about the importance of personnel quality. So this is something that through recruitment and retention, they're also thinking about education and the training, professional military education to try to develop the future force that they want for themselves, which is of course not just a matter of hardware, but also a matter of having personnel who are able to do everything from develop their future strategies and doctrine to command troops in the field and educate their future leaders and the like. And so it's an area that they pay a lot of attention to in which they also would assess that they have yet to accomplish the objectives that they've set for themselves that they still have some challenges. Um, I think that's a pretty good summary of you know where they are right now. I'm sorry, could you please remind me the second half of the question? Q:  I mean, just in terms of trajectory, are they getting better from y'all's estimation, however you determine that? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Yes. I mean, I think we can see improvement over time. To be clear, they also, I think, find themselves still having some shortcomings that they need to continue to address. As for the sort of ultimate test of the personnel, I think that that for the PLA right now comes in their exercises and operations and they themselves note that they lack any recent experience in combat operations. In fact, not just any recent experience, since the 1979 conflict with Vietnam was the last large scale combat operations they were involved in. And so I think that they do pay a lot of attention to their overseas deployments and to their exercises as the best way to measure the progress that they're making. But I think that they at the same time note some uncertainty about that question because of the lack of recent combat experience and sort of high-intensity operational experience of the type that would really put it to the test. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thank you. Next, we'll have Idris Ali with Reuters. Q:  Yeah, two quick questions. Do you have a sense or a specific number for how many senior Chinese military leaders may have been removed for corruption or just a sense that we're talking a couple dozen of that? And then secondly, in the factsheet, you talk about how the PLA has made uneven progress towards its 2027 capability milestone. Would you say that the PLA is closer to its 2027 goal this year as it was compared to last year or has there been a backsliding towards that goal this year? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  I don't have a specific number for the total of senior PLA officers who have been implicated in corruption scandals or arrested or convicted or anything like that. I mean, it might also—you'd probably have to think about how senior you're defining because although the senior most people tend to get the lion's share of the media attention, if you read the PRC official medial, they continue also to pursue people at all levels. So that's a notable component of the overall anti-corruption campaign. But dating back many years, they've talked about a campaign that would target from tigers to flies I think is the term if I'm remembering it correctly. And so they're kind of covering at all levels where they have found corruption to be a problem within the PLA. In terms of overall progress toward the 2027 modernization goals, we continue to track that very closely. Each year, we're kind of presenting a snapshot and we continue to assess that and evaluate that as time goes on. And I don't believe that we make an overall judgment in the report this year about whether they're further along overall or have been sliding back. I think it's a mixed bag in that we certainly do highlight and take very seriously the progress they're making in a number of the areas that we noted in the report. And at the same time, we try to take note of those areas in which they've demonstrated some shortcomings, whether they're ones that are self-assessed or that  we've observed. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thanks. Next, we'll have Chris Gordon, please. Q:  Thank you. Thanks, sir, for doing this. The report says the PLA Air Force is modernizing its aircraft and unmanned aerial systems rapidly matching US standards. To clarify, should we read this as the PLA Air Forces' aircraft are a match for the US aircraft and other US military aircraft or is that an unfair characterization? Could you elaborate a little more on that point? And I have a follow up to that more specifically. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Sure. First of all, I'd say in the report, I think that reference is specific to the UAS, not to the entirety of the PLA Air Force. And secondly, I would say there are definitely continuing to improve their capabilities, but we would not assess that they have caught up with or surpassed the US Air Force. That would go beyond the judgment that we reached in the report. And what's the second part of the question. Q:  Yeah. The second part of the question, the report says China has operationally fielded the J-20 stealth fighter. Can you say where and how they have fielded the J-20? And can you give a broad assessment of how the US assesses the capabilities of the J-35 stealth fighter that they've introduced? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  So on the J-20, we can say that as of early 2023, they've been increasing their production capacity and building a new assembly plant to prepare to further expand production. It's an outcome of a long-standing effort to try to improve domestic aircraft engine production in part, and they have begun to switch to domestically produced engines, although some Russian engines may remain in use. The PLA Air Force is also still working on upgrading the J-20. So we see a number of possibilities there in terms of upgrades for the J-20. And I think we have a little bit to say about some of those in the report. On the J-35, I don't think I can really provide anything beyond what we've shared in the report at this time. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  All right. Thank you very much. Next is Haley Britski with CNN. Q:  Thank you. Most of mine have been asked and answered, but just to follow up, I just want to double check, because it seemed earlier like there wasn't a super clear answer. On the corruption impacting the 2027 timeline, do you assess that it has already been impacted or that it just could be if they don't, I guess, fix that problem? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  I think it's having some impact already, but it could be at this point in terms of looking at the overall trajectory toward 2027. I think that's something that we'll, inevitably, we'll address again and update in the upcoming CMPRs as we continue to track the anti-corruption investigations and the impact that they're having on personnel, on construction projects and on the development and acquisition of new capabilities for the PLA. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thanks. Next, we'll take Ashley with breaking defense, please. Q:  Hi. Thanks. Just two quick questions. One, the report mentions lessons learned from the war in Ukraine possibly going into strategic objectives and possibly tactics. Are you able to give any color on that? And then also, it seems an ICBM that could potentially hit the US. It seemed to have similar language that they were thinking about it. Was there any progress over the last year developing such a weapon? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  So first, let me take the question on Russia, Ukraine and then I'll turn to the—I think you're asking about the conventional ICBM in particular. Q:  Correct. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  So the PRC is definitely trying to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine. And I think trying to apply those lessons to their own objectives and their own circumstances. Which of course, while there may be some similarities, there are some important differences as well. But I think that they're looking at things like trying to persuade the countries that they would refer to as the global south to accept PRC narratives about global security issues and regional security issues about Taiwan. I think they see that the information space is an important domain for competition and for trying to advance their objectives. Which, of course, they've thought for quite a while, but I think the lessons from the war here are probably reinforcing that and taking them further down that path. And I think that when they look at the western sanctions against Russia, that has certainly amplified the PRC's push to try to have greater self-sufficiency for defense and technology. And also more financial resilience to try to ensure that they would be able to withstand sanctions. So those are just a few areas. I'm sure there's more we could get into, but I'll leave it there for now. On the ICBM, the overall kind of trajectory of the force here is about developing more and more survivable ICBMs. So more numbers and greater survivability to improve their nuclear capable missile forces. But we have noted, as you pointed out, that they also are showing some interest in developing a new conventional ICBM that could strike Hawaii, Alaska and the continental United States. And I think this is in part to address what they've seen as a long-standing asymmetry in the US's ability to conduct conventional strikes against the PRC, and for many decades, their inability to reach out and strike the US territory with anything other than nuclear armed ballistic missiles. So I think that's sort of the fundamental driver of trying to pursue that capability. Apart from that, I don't think we have any more to share at the moment beyond what's in the report on the conventional ICBM capability. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  OK. Next, we'll have Ryo Kiyomiya. Q:  Hi. Thank you for doing this. My question is about China's nuclear capability. Firstly, in the Pentagon's 2022 annual report on China, it was estimated that China aims to have around 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035. Does this estimation still hold? And secondly, last year the annual report estimated that China had over 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023 and now it's estimated that China has more than 600 operational nuclear warheads as of mid 2024. So does this exceed some of Pentagon's previous predictions? Thank you. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  So with the estimate that their stockpile contains more than 600 operational nuclear warheads as of mid 2024, it's about 100 more than the estimate in the previous year's report. At the risk of trying to do math without a calculator in front of me, I mean, I think we're showing a rate of growth that is pretty well consistent with what we've described in reports over the past three years, a few years about their nuclear expansion and modernization. We're not including a 2035 number. As you noted, what we say in the report is that by 2030 we assess they'll have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads and that we think that they will continue growing their force to 2035 in line with the previous estimates that you mentioned. For 2035, we're still over a decade away and I think we're still learning more, and the PRC may be still defining for itself, more of what basically completing PLA modernization means for 2035. That could certainly change the PRC's perception of its strategic security environment, is something that is always evolving and that that they're reassessing. And so that certainly could impact the total number of warheads that they think that they will need that far into the future. So that's why we kind of stopped at 2030 this year, but I would certainly expect them to continue expanding and modernizing their force after that. And beyond that, I would just note that the report covers at great length, not just the numbers, but also the diversification and modernization of their forces, which I think it's important to take a look at as well, because we've got a force that's not only growing in terms of those numbers of operationally deployed warheads, but also in sort of diversity and sophistication. When you look at what they're trying to build here, it's a diversified nuclear force that would be comprised of systems ranging from low yield, precision strike missiles, all the way up to ICBMs with different options at basically every rung on the escalation ladder, which is a lot different than what they've relied on traditionally. And I think that really is the key takeaway on the nuclear force and the report. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  All right. Thanks. We'll go to Anton LaGuardia next. Q:  Hi, Mike. Thank you very much for doing this with us. Can I pick up on Ryo's question about the nuclear force? What do you assess as the Chinese objective in developing this escalation, options at every point in the escalation ladder. How far do they want to go? And what does that say about any change in the nuclear doctrine such as launch on warning or indeed getting away from their previous hitherto doctrine of minimal nuclear deterrence? And I got a follow up. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Oh, sure. Let me start with that part. So the PRC has reiterated on a number of occasions that their nuclear policy hasn't changed, but we certainly see them developing a force that gives them a much broader range of capabilities for different types of scenarios. As I mentioned, different rungs on the escalation ladder that goes beyond what they have traditionally considered sufficient for their requirements, not just in numbers, but also, again, in diversity of capabilities and in technological sophistication. And so I think you would have to ask them about the exact motivating factors. But I think that there are a wide range of factors here. Again, it's everything from what they are thinking about their overall external security environment, which as we note in the report they see as becoming more turbulent. It's a function of how they think about their relationships with the United States and other major powers who they consider potential adversaries or rivals. It's also, perhaps, to some extent, a little bit of technologically driven in terms of how they've modernized their conventional force and maybe some of those attributes and characteristics being applied to the nuclear force. I think that certainly could be part of it as well. And I think we see them also presumably changing what they think is required for their national security needs. When we've engaged with the PRC on this, they've often stated with us that they continue to maintain their nuclear force at the level that they think is sort of the level that's required for their national security needs. And our response to them has been that they must judge that their national security requirements have changed because of the size and structure of the force changing the way that it has. So I think that's basically what the case is here. They're going to be able to target, um a larger number of targets, some different types of targets, greater levels of damage, more options for multiple rounds of counter strikes and more kind of tailored employment of lower yield weapons and the like. I mean, these are all attributes of their nuclear modernization and expansion. We'll certainly continue to monitor it. We would urge Beijing to be more transparent about it. And we make clear in our own Nuclear Posture Review that we're going to maintain an extended deterrence strategy that we won't be deterred from defending our allies and partners and that we won't be coerced. So that's kind of where we stand. And we would urge the PRC to engage in more conversations about what they're developing is going to motivate the United States and others to take appropriate steps in response and what all of that means for strategic stability. Q:  And just as a follow up, apologies, you mentioned the greater capability to operate beyond the first island chain. Is the purpose of that simply to sort of defend in depth so that they could conduct an operation the first island chain or is that a different objective? And to what extent are the Russians, joint patrols and joint exercises with the Russians helping them to achieve that? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  So I think that there is, as you put it, a defense in depth element to that, but they also perceive themselves as a global power with global security interests that requires military capabilities commensurate with meeting that challenge. So I think there are multiple factors that are leading them to want to be able to conduct different kinds of military operations at greater distances. The exercises with Russia, I see a little bit more in the context of demonstrating the strength of their relationship and their partnership with the Russians as opposed to really focused on displaying or improving their ability to expand their global reach. But I think that's, apart from what we convey in the report, I think that's about as much as I've got to add at the moment. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thanks. We'll go to Liz Frieden with Fox News next. Q:  Hey, thanks for doing this. Can you point to a specific weapon or capability China's developing that's most concerning to you? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  I don't think that there's one specific capability that I would say concerns me above the rest. It really is less about any one individual weapon. And I know there would be plenty of candidates just based on questions people have asked today and then questions we've had in previous years. But I think we're focused most acutely on their ability to tie all of that together. So not just any one weapon, but how they're able to employ the new capabilities that they're developing and acquiring to try to execute the types of campaigns that they have written about and that they try to prepare for through their exercises. So we're concerned about that and making sure that we're staying ahead of that pacing challenge. And of course, we're also very focused on how they operate with the capabilities that they have today. So when we have some coercive or intimidating behavior toward our allies and partners, or unsafe operational behavior that risks an accident or an incident, I think those are the kind of things that concern me the most in the immediate term. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thanks. Next, we'll go to Brad Dress. Q:  Hi. Thanks for taking my question. One area that I noticed was lacking in the report was how advanced China's capabilities are on developing autonomous drones and AI weapons. So just curious, can you say how far advanced China is in this area and how do they compare to the US on this? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Unfortunately, I don't think I can really give you a very clear comparison with the US. I would say it's definitely an area that they have emphasized and made a lot of investments in and one where I think not just in terms of military developments. But it's one of many areas in which I think they're really looking for the civil military fusion, even though they don't use that term themselves anymore, to pay some dividends in terms of trying to incorporate advances from other sources of development of those kinds of technologies and capabilities in the PRC. So definitely one that they've emphasized that they have devoted a lot of attention to, that senior leaders mentioned in their speeches and the like, but I don't think I can give you a comprehensive assessment. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thanks. We'll go to Carla Babb next. Q:  Hey. Thanks for doing this. A couple of questions. First, can you just talk about how China's shrinking economy affected its investment in the military over the past year, if it was able to invest the same amount or less? And then my second question is just overall on the Navy, if you could follow up on Jeff Shogaol's point that the number has not changed with the size of their navy? The US usually says, well they may have more ships, but we have more tonnage. Have the Chinese managed to shrink that advantage, that ability to place weapons and equipment on ships over the past year? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  So on the ships, I will see if we can get back to you through the PA team with anything more detailed. But I think I would note also that, of course it's about when we're comparing naval capabilities, not just about numbers or tonnage, but about the quality, technological sophistication, performance, characteristics, are we talking about multi-mission ships that can conduct anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare and how well and how effectively can they tie all of that together with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities with what their other services are doing and so on. So that's kind of how you would think about it in the context of sort of a net assessment. But let me see if we can get you any more on the shipbuilding question. On PRC defense spending, I would look at it this way. In the report this year we looked at multiple different approaches to modeling the PRC's defense budget. And what we found basically was that it's about one and a half to two times more than they announce their public defense budget to be. So if you're talking about a publicly stated defense budget of 220 billion, which I believe was the number in 2023, then we're telling you here that's probably something more like 330 to 440 billion, right, in terms of their actual defense spending relative to their announced defense spending. The economic forecast that projects slowing PRC economic growth, not just right now, but what's projected like over the next five to 10 years or so, certainly could slow future defense spending growth. I would say, right now, I don't think we're in a situation where the PRC would be truly hard-pressed to continue to fund its defense modernization at the levels of what we've seen in recent years and what they appear to think is required to achieve their milestones and the sort of near, medium and long-term. But I do think that slowing growth would inevitably cause them to think more about tradeoffs, what they're going to prioritize, what they're going to deprioritize and so on. Q:  OK. Thank you. So they could slow growth, but you haven't seen it yet? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  Right. And I would say it's not just a—yes, I mean it could slow growth in the defense budget, absolutely. And they've generally tried to have the defense budget sort of track where they are overall. I think there are a number of PRC scholars who have written about trying to avoid falling into the trap that the Soviet Union fell into with excessive defense spending that was unsustainable based on its economic trajectory. So they are attentive to that to be sure. What I'm suggesting is that apart from the top line number or the rate of growth, that within even a growing defense budget, if they're looking to pursue potentially very expensive capabilities as they are nuclear force modernization aircraft carriers and so on, along with all the other things that they're doing, that one of the ways that you would see a slowing growth have an impact on the PLA would be in terms of forcing some prioritization, maybe having to cut something in order to be able to continue making progress at the desired rate on something else. I guess that's probably how I would think about it. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thanks. Next question goes to Howard Altman. Q:  Thank you very much for doing this, appreciate it. I got a couple of questions. One, on the H-20 and regional bombers, can you give more details about how many will be produced, when they'll be delivered, their stealth capabilities? Will they have a CCA like loyal wingman component and the DOD's concerns about what they could bring to the table? And then can you give us a status update of the Co orbital satellite development, where they are with that in terms of putting those weapons in space? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  So I appreciate the questions and unfortunately, I can't really go beyond what appears in the CMPR on either of those topics. As you can imagine, we do try to make available as much information as we can, but I'm not able to go beyond what's in the report for now. Q:  OK. Thanks. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Thanks. Next, we'll have Dmitri. Q:  Thank you. Mike, I just want to go back to the question about why the 2035 nuclear warhead estimate, the 1,500 number, was not included. Did something change on the Chinese side that made you think you shouldn't put that number in there or have you just decided to be more cautious because it's harder to predict? And then as a follow on, just to get it in early, in the fact sheet it says since late 2023, the PLA reduced the number of, quote, unquote, coercive and risky air intercepts. As of a couple of months ago, my understanding was there had been no intercepts since the San Francisco summit. So have they started again even if it's only a small number? Thanks. SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  So on the first question, I think it's the latter of the options that you raised that the further out we go, I think the more challenging it is to have a projection that you can have great confidence in because there are so many variables that could cause them to adjust either what they think is necessary or what they're able to do at that point. When you're talking ten years in the future as opposed to the next, say, three to five years. And on the second, the intercepts, as long as they're not coercive, risky, dangerous intercepts, I mean, intercepts happen pretty regularly. What we're saying is that we haven't seen intercepts of US forces that we would characterize as coercive or risky. We certainly have seen both intercepts that are of a more expected kind of variety. That certainly happens. And we have seen also operational behavior directed toward our allies and partners that we absolutely would characterize as coercive and risky, and running the risk of an accident or an incident, injury, loss of life and so on. Q:  Just to clarify, so since San Francisco— SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  I mentioned earlier, the Philippines as a prominent example of that. Q:  OK. Just to clarify, though, since San Francisco, you're still not aware of any coercive and risky air intercepts against US assets? SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL:  No, nothing that I can identify off the top of my head at this time. I will ask the team to go back and double check and make sure I'm not missing anything, but I don't believe so. Q:  Thank you. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  All right. And last question will go to Courtney Kube with NBC, please. Q:  I'm all set. I don't have a question. Thank you. Sorry, did you hear me? I don't have a question. Thanks. MAJ. PETE NGUYEN:  Yeah. Thanks, Courtney. Thank you all for being here today. Again, you can attribute today's information to a senior defense official. The embargo on today's briefing lifts on Wednesday at 10:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time. My name is Maj. Pete Nguyen. My colleague, John Supple, can also take any follow up questions via email if you have any. Thank you so much.

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